Gender And The Perils Of Identity Politics In India

Zoya Hasan, 30 November 2010

India’s democraticpolitics has witnessed significant shifts that can be traced to the definingperiod from 1989 -91 when the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy and therapid rise of political organizations that espouse Hindutva (Hinduness) changed the contours both of its economy and politics. But apartfrom six years of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government from 1998to 2004, India has not been governed by a political party or a coalition ofparties that make explicit appeals to religion. Nevertheless, religious andidentity politics is an important force in India’s public life. Althoughpoliticised religion gained further momentum under BJP rule even secularparties such as the Congress Party, which has ruled India for more than fourdecades, has found the idea of scoring quick electoral gains by tampering withsecular principles and institutions too tempting to resist. The electoralvictory of the United Progressive Alliance led by the Indian National Congressin the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections, defeating the BJP-led coalitionwas seen, in this context, as a respite for secular politics.

A series of events, someunintended, others calculated helped anti-secular forces to gain a foothold inthe political system. The unravelling of the secular fabric began with demandsfor regional autonomy in Punjab and the manner in which the state chose torespond to those demands. The Congress decided to play “the Hindu card” toundercut the popularity of its regional rival, the Akali Dal in Punjab. In alandmark case delivered in 1985, the Supreme Court called for the enactment ofa uniform civil code which would give all women regardless of faith equalrights – for example, the right to alimony or maintenance once divorced. Thisjudgment granted a maintenance allowance to Shah Bano, a seventy threeyear old Muslim divorcee, to be paid by her husband under the CriminalProcedure Code. Acting on the advice of the clergy, the government took thedecision of to nullify the court’s verdict and enact legislationdeclaring that Muslim women would not have access to civil law in matters ofmarriage and divorce. This one piece of legislation- the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 - that allowedMuslim personal law to prevail in contravention of the Supreme Court decisioninflamed Hindu sentiments. It was cited again and again by Hindu politicalactivists to claim that Hindus, as a majority community, are discriminatedagainst - an absurd charge, given that the discrimination in question isagainst Muslim women, rather than Hindu men.

The most far-reaching inthis series of events, damaging and destabilizing secularism, was themishandling of the Ayodhyadispute. From the mid-1980s, the BJP and its affiliates launched a nationwide campaignto construct a Ram temple at the site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in thestate of Uttar Pradesh in north India. Hindu activists had been claiming thatthe mosque stood at the exact spot believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram.Several decisions of the Congress government in Delhi and in Uttar Pradesh,which included unlocking the disputed site, allowing the foundation stones ofthe proposed Ram temple to be laid near the mosque, had the effect ofcompromising the secular principle of separation of religion and politics andencouraging the BJP to intensify its campaign for a Ram temple.

Both the Shah Bano and Ayodhyadecisions, calculated to appease communally minded Hindus and Muslimsrespectively, ended up giving a massive boost to the forces of the Hindu right,reflected in the BJP’s rise from a mere two seats in 1984 to eighty-nine LokSabha seats in 1989. The growth of Hindu nationalism was aided in large measureby political opposition, especially in northern and western India, againstreservations for lower castes in education and government jobs. The partysucceeded in taking advantage of the increase in caste conflicts aroundredistributive policies for lower and backward caste Hindus, particularly overreservations in educational institutions and government jobs. The turning pointin this process came in 1989 when the central government-appointed Mandal Commissiondecided to implement the long-standing government report that recommended mandatoryreservations of 33 per cent in government employment for theOBCs.

During the Ayodhyamovement in the 1990s, the Sangh Parivarintensified the mobilization of women with the assistance of affiliatedorganizations and the female leadership they had fostered. For the first timethe Sangh Parivar won recruits among educated middle-class families and peoplewith professional backgrounds for the Hindutva cause. It was a majoradvance insofar as it succeeded in mobilizing women and bringing them into thepolitics of the Hindu right, albeit mainly by means of re-enacting theirprivate, domestic roles - for example, preparing food packets for karsevaks(Hindu volunteers) during the Ayodhya campaign.

On the face of it, theSangh Parivar appears to promote women’s activism, helping the BJP inmarshalling fresh support since 1989. Many leaders projected the publicparticipation of women as a sign of the emancipation of Hindu women. However,while the Sangh combine brought women out into the public domain, it did so inways that do not challenge their traditional roles within a generallyconservative domesticity. Whereas the women’s movement in India challengesnotions of women’s subordination within the family and society, Hindutvaideology places them squarely within the private domain and propagates apatriarchal model of gender relations even though it brings women out intopublic spaces.

Nonetheless, many womenparticipants felt empowered by the experience of public activism on behalf of Hindutva.Less noticed, however, was the fact that the women who participated in theAyodhya movement also quickly returned to traditional roles, working within theconfines of their family and community and routinely spreading the ideology of Hindutvaand the BJP. Advocacy of their rights was not what drew women to activism; theprincipal attraction was Hindutva’s emotional charge. Thus, Hinduwomen’s activism works in the service of Hindutva and not in support ofwomen’s gender interests as such.

Even though women’sempowerment is not central to the Hindutva project, it appears keen topromote Muslim women’s rights. On the one hand, BJP derides and decries theprinciple of minority rights, a key feature of Indian secularism, as anunwarranted privilege, thus decoupling secularism and minority rights. Onthe other hand, it supports Muslim women’s rights only to draw attention to theunreformed character of Muslim personal law and to seek its abolition. Thishelps them to compensate for their attack on minority rights by appearing todefend Muslim women’s rights. This defence was staged in order to establish theparty’s liberal credentials even though they do little to advance Hindu women’srights.

Over the years the debateon religion in the women’s movement in India has shifted from a position thatvirtually ignored religion to an attempt to work for religious reform fromwithin. This shift occurred at a time when the communalization of politics andthe politicization of religion led to the retreat of secularism and to attackson minority rights. As the issue of minorities was catapulted to centre stageMuslim women’s rights became a subject of considerable debate, typically withreference to the status of Muslim personal law and the conflicting claimsaround the demand for a uniform civilcode.

The BJP is the strongestadvocate of a uniform civil code, while Muslim conservatives are among itsstrongest opponents. The party had raised the issue principally to embarrassthe Congress party which was reluctant to change the status quo in the face of Muslimopposition to it. The BJP has argued that leaving Muslim law untouched impliesunequal and asymmetrical treatment. This asymmetry has formed the basis for thecharge that secularism, especially secular practice, implies pandering toMuslims for electoral gains. The Muslim leadership, on the other hand, fearsthat such laws would inevitably lead to uniform cultural practices and aliencustoms being foisted upon them.

From the outset, theproblem with the uniform civil code debate was its gratuitous emphasis onuniformity which found its reflection in terming it a “uniform” civil code. Itbecame a debate about uniformity versus minority rights, secularism versusreligious laws, and modernization versus tradition. A decisive shift occurredin the wake of the Ayodhya conflict and the dramatic growth of the BJP, andwith it grew Muslim fears of the imposition of a ‘Hindu’ code. The change wasmost explicit in the case of the left leaning All IndiaDemocratic Women’s Association which, not very long ago, promoted auniform civil code, but now favours a gradual change in personal laws,acknowledging the difficulty of pushing change through state initiative. Itsupports a two-pronged strategy to achieve reconciliation between gender-justlaws as well as reforms from within.

In the context of thesecontroversies, an important development has been the emergence of Muslimwomen’s activism seeking to promote women’s rights rather than focusing allenergies on changing personal laws. Muslim women in India face considerablechallenges as citizens and as members of the largest minority. They suffer frommultiple disadvantages in areas such as education, employment, and access towelfare programmes.

The emergence in recentyears of forums and associations of Muslim women is an important step infacilitating a new public debate on women's rights. The alliance of Muslimwomen’s groups with the broader women's movement, together with movements forsecularism, democracy, and human rights, has also been crucial in broad-basingthe struggle for women’s rights. Two Mumbai-based groups -- Women’s Research and Action Group and Aawaz-e-Niswan are important initiativeswhich have gone beyond personal laws to promote gender equality. They aim toprovide aid and support to poor, illiterate, and marginalized women, whilstraising their consciousness about the gender inequities and the need toovercome them. Their engagement with legal reform is an outgrowth of thesebroad-based activities. Although these efforts have not to date inspired thedevelopment of a major reform movement among Muslims, they represent vitalsteps in seeking to build a rights-based movement. There is, for the firsttime, the beginnings of serious debate on social and legal reform.

Over the past twenty yearsor so the politicization of religion has made considerable headway in India butit has not overwhelmed secular politics.. India’s democratic politics haswitnessed significant shifts that can be traced to the defining period from1989 -91 when the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy and the rapid riseof political organizations that espouse Hindutva (Hinduness) changed the contours both of its economy and politics. But apartfrom six years of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government from 1998to 2004, India has not been governed by a political party or a coalition ofparties that make explicit appeals to religion. Nevertheless, religious andidentity politics is an important force in India’s public life. Althoughpoliticised religion gained further momentum under BJP rule even secularparties such as the Congress Party, which has ruled India for more than fourdecades, has found the idea of scoring quick electoral gains by tampering withsecular principles and institutions too tempting to resist. The electoralvictory of the United Progressive Alliance led by the Indian National Congressin the 2004 and 2009 parliamentary elections, defeating the BJP-led coalitionwas seen, in this context, as a respite for secular politics.

A series of events, someunintended, others calculated helped anti-secular forces to gain a foothold inthe political system. The unravelling of the secular fabric began with demandsfor regional autonomy in Punjab and the manner in which the state chose torespond to those demands. The Congress decided to play “the Hindu card” toundercut the popularity of its regional rival, the Akali Dal in Punjab. In alandmark case delivered in 1985, the Supreme Court called for the enactment ofa uniform civil code which would give all women regardless of faith equalrights – for example, the right to alimony or maintenance once divorced. Thisjudgment granted a maintenance allowance to Shah Bano, a seventy threeyear old Muslim divorcee, to be paid by her husband under the CriminalProcedure Code. Acting on the advice of the clergy, the government took thedecision of to nullify the court’s verdict and enact legislationdeclaring that Muslim women would not have access to civil law in matters ofmarriage and divorce. This one piece of legislation- the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986 - that allowedMuslim personal law to prevail in contravention of the Supreme Court decisioninflamed Hindu sentiments. It was cited again and again by Hindu politicalactivists to claim that Hindus, as a majority community, are discriminatedagainst - an absurd charge, given that the discrimination in question isagainst Muslim women, rather than Hindu men.

The most far-reaching inthis series of events, damaging and destabilizing secularism, was themishandling of the Ayodhyadispute. From the mid-1980s, the BJP and its affiliates launched a nationwide campaignto construct a Ram temple at the site of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in thestate of Uttar Pradesh in north India. Hindu activists had been claiming thatthe mosque stood at the exact spot believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram.Several decisions of the Congress government in Delhi and in Uttar Pradesh,which included unlocking the disputed site, allowing the foundation stones ofthe proposed Ram temple to be laid near the mosque, had the effect ofcompromising the secular principle of separation of religion and politics and encouragingthe BJP to intensify its campaign for a Ram temple.

Both the Shah Bano andAyodhya decisions, calculated to appease communally minded Hindus and Muslimsrespectively, ended up giving a massive boost to the forces of the Hindu right,reflected in the BJP’s rise from a mere two seats in 1984 to eighty-nine LokSabha seats in 1989. The growth of Hindu nationalism was aided in large measureby political opposition, especially in northern and western India, againstreservations for lower castes in education and government jobs. The partysucceeded in taking advantage of the increase in caste conflicts aroundredistributive policies for lower and backward caste Hindus, particularly overreservations in educational institutions and government jobs. The turning pointin this process came in 1989 when the central government-appointed MandalCommission decided to implement the long-standing government report thatrecommended mandatoryreservations of 33 per cent in government employment for theOBCs.

During the Ayodhyamovement in the 1990s, the Sangh Parivarintensified the mobilization of women with the assistance of affiliatedorganizations and the female leadership they had fostered. For the first timethe Sangh Parivar won recruits among educated middle-class families and peoplewith professional backgrounds for the Hindutva cause. It was a majoradvance insofar as it succeeded in mobilizing women and bringing them into thepolitics of the Hindu right, albeit mainly by means of re-enacting theirprivate, domestic roles - for example, preparing food packets for karsevaks(Hindu volunteers) during the Ayodhya campaign.

On the face of it, theSangh Parivar appears to promote women’s activism, helping the BJP inmarshalling fresh support since 1989. Many leaders projected the publicparticipation of women as a sign of the emancipation of Hindu women. However,while the Sangh combine brought women out into the public domain, it did so inways that do not challenge their traditional roles within a generallyconservative domesticity. Whereas the women’s movement in India challenges notionsof women’s subordination within the family and society, Hindutvaideology places them squarely within the private domain and propagates apatriarchal model of gender relations even though it brings women out intopublic spaces.

Nonetheless, many womenparticipants felt empowered by the experience of public activism on behalf of Hindutva.Less noticed, however, was the fact that the women who participated in theAyodhya movement also quickly returned to traditional roles, working within theconfines of their family and community and routinely spreading the ideology of Hindutvaand the BJP. Advocacy of their rights was not what drew women to activism; theprincipal attraction was Hindutva’s emotional charge. Thus, Hinduwomen’s activism works in the service of Hindutva and not in support ofwomen’s gender interests as such.

Even though women’sempowerment is not central to the Hindutva project, it appears keen topromote Muslim women’s rights. On the one hand, BJP derides and decries theprinciple of minority rights, a key feature of Indian secularism, as anunwarranted privilege, thus decoupling secularism and minority rights. Onthe other hand, it supports Muslim women’s rights only to draw attention to theunreformed character of Muslim personal law and to seek its abolition. Thishelps them to compensate for their attack on minority rights by appearing todefend Muslim women’s rights. This defence was staged in order to establish theparty’s liberal credentials even though they do little to advance Hindu women’srights.

Over the years the debateon religion in the women’s movement in India has shifted from a position thatvirtually ignored religion to an attempt to work for religious reform fromwithin. This shift occurred at a time when the communalization of politics andthe politicization of religion led to the retreat of secularism and to attackson minority rights. As the issue of minorities was catapulted to centre stageMuslim women’s rights became a subject of considerable debate, typically withreference to the status of Muslim personal law and the conflicting claimsaround the demand for a uniform civilcode.

The BJP is the strongestadvocate of a uniform civil code, while Muslim conservatives are among itsstrongest opponents. The party had raised the issue principally to embarrassthe Congress party which was reluctant to change the status quo in the face ofMuslim opposition to it. The BJP has argued that leaving Muslim law untouchedimplies unequal and asymmetrical treatment. This asymmetry has formed the basisfor the charge that secularism, especially secular practice, implies panderingto Muslims for electoral gains. The Muslim leadership, on the other hand, fearsthat such laws would inevitably lead to uniform cultural practices and aliencustoms being foisted upon them.

From the outset, theproblem with the uniform civil code debate was its gratuitous emphasis onuniformity which found its reflection in terming it a “uniform” civil code. Itbecame a debate about uniformity versus minority rights, secularism versusreligious laws, and modernization versus tradition. A decisive shift occurredin the wake of the Ayodhya conflict and the dramatic growth of the BJP, andwith it grew Muslim fears of the imposition of a ‘Hindu’ code. The change wasmost explicit in the case of the left leaning All IndiaDemocratic Women’s Association which, not very long ago, promoted auniform civil code, but now favours a gradual change in personal laws,acknowledging the difficulty of pushing change through state initiative. Itsupports a two-pronged strategy to achieve reconciliation between gender-justlaws as well as reforms from within.

In the context of thesecontroversies, an important development has been the emergence of Muslimwomen’s activism seeking to promote women’s rights rather than focusing allenergies on changing personal laws. Muslim women in India face considerablechallenges as citizens and as members of the largest minority. They suffer frommultiple disadvantages in areas such as education, employment, and access towelfare programmes.

The emergence in recentyears of forums and associations of Muslim women is an important step infacilitating a new public debate on women's rights. The alliance of Muslimwomen’s groups with the broader women's movement, together with movements forsecularism, democracy, and human rights, has also been crucial in broad-basingthe struggle for women’s rights. Two Mumbai-based groups -- Women’s Research and Action Group and Aawaz-e-Niswan are important initiativeswhich have gone beyond personal laws to promote gender equality. They aim toprovide aid and support to poor, illiterate, and marginalized women, whilstraising their consciousness about the gender inequities and the need toovercome them. Their engagement with legal reform is an outgrowth of thesebroad-based activities. Although these efforts have not to date inspired thedevelopment of a major reform movement among Muslims, they represent vitalsteps in seeking to build a rights-based movement. There is, for the firsttime, the beginnings of serious debate on social and legal reform.

Over the past twenty yearsor so the politicization of religion has made considerable headway in India butit has not overwhelmed secular politics.. Nonetheless, the Hindu right hasdemonstrated an enormous capacity to mobilize women. Hindu women’s activismprovides a compelling example of the instrumentalization of femaleconstituencies in the service of the political goals of the BJP and the SanghParivar. The most important issue is not the growth of religious politics perse, but the inordinate play of identity politics in public life which hasresulted in paradoxes such as the protection of conservatism among Muslims.This is the effect of a secularism that envisages state intervention in theaffairs of the majority religion, but endorses strict non-intervention inminority religions, thus paradoxically empowering religious conservatives in thename of secularism.

Nonetheless, the Hinduright has demonstrated an enormous capacity to mobilize women. Hindu women’sactivism provides a compelling example of the instrumentalization of femaleconstituencies in the service of the political goals of the BJP and the SanghParivar. The most important issue is not the growth of religious politics perse, but the inordinate play of identity politics in public life which hasresulted in paradoxes such as the protection of conservatism among Muslims.This is the effect of a secularism that envisages state intervention in theaffairs of the majority religion, but endorses strict non-intervention inminority religions, thus paradoxically empowering religious conservatives inthe name of secularism.